Abstract. This paper follows our previous research where we made a basic experiment to nd out if it is possible to detect malware by multiple PE header detection. The previous results show us that there is a considerable amount of malwares that connect themselves to another le. This paper summarizes our previous results, updates the results and also expands them by adding an optimization method and also by including the scan of another (specic) types of data.
Introduction
The subject of our research is a malware detection method and testing of other related methods. The aim is to use an unconventional approach to malware detection, to test existing methods, improve them or to create a new method, if the method produces satisfactory results. The currently examined topic is malware detection by using metadata. Malware detection by metadata testing is a topic that is not often covered and this is the reason why we chose it for our research. This paper describes a detection method based on the idea of malware detection by multiple PE headers occurrence.
From our previous research, it is apparent that there are groups of malwares called parasitic viruses they infect other les by connecting their code to the host le. They also often connect their own headers and if the malware is connected by one of the methods described below, the original le contains more than one header.
We are able to detect multiple PE headers and if the scanned le goes through our optimization lter, this le is labelled as dangerous.
Related Work
In 2001 
1) Prepending Viruses:
In the process of infection, the virus puts its own 2) Appending Viruses:
The virus appends its code at the end of the infecting le. Because the malicious code is at the end of the le, the malware must also change the original code to assure malware activation when the le is executed. 3) Inserting Viruses:
The malicious code is placed at the address to which the entry point value points and the rest of the code is moved under the malicious code.
The entry point is a value referring to the start of the executable code itself. Another way to put the code in non-destructively is to spread the code to the unused places in the le. That 
4) Overwriting Viruses:
Malware infects the le in a way that the original le is overwritten by the virus's own copy. Unlike others, this method is destructive. The virus can overwrite the le from the beginning but it can also choose another start location (Random Overwriting Viruses). If the executable le is overwritten from the beginning, the PE header is also overwritten and the original program will not be able to run without a header reconstruction (instead, the malware will run). If a random section of the original le is overwritten, it is possible that the program will work but it will also probably crash. PE signature value has the similar meaning as e_magic value from the DOS MZ header.
The value is equal to 0x50450000 ("PE \0\0"
in ASCII) and it is used for the identication of PE header. The machine value holding the type of CPU the code is compiled for (the value is used for compatibility check). Magic eld is a 2-byte value placed at the beginning of the optional header and representing the architecture type (0x010B for PE32, 0x020B for PE64, 0x0107 ROM). AddressOfEntryPoint is an address of the application entry point (address where the applications code begins). Table: Dened in IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER 
4) Section

Experiment
The goal of our research is to scan a representative number of samples and to determine how often the malware is bound to host le by one of the described method. It will be also tested if it is possible to nd malware by detecting multiple PE headers. The necessary condition is that malware connects itself (including PE header)
to the code without destroying the header of the previous le. The experiment focuses on connecting the malicious code only on executable les. The goal is also to make a result opti-VOLUME 3) Malware Protection:
It is common practice to protect malware against detection and analyzing. When malware is packed, it is more dicult to use static analysis. A sample must be unpacked before. Packer takes the original malware, makes wrapper and creates a new binary le. The whole binary or only part of the le can be packed. PE header must be reconstructed for PE header analysis.
[15] We connected our application to Cuckoo sandbox [21] to perform the detection of obfuscation and also data gathering from such packed applications.
Results
We tested package of goodware and bad samples separately. After testing all the samples, it was discovered that 504 (9.884 %) of total 5099 mal- Following the discovery that multiple headers appear in uninstallers mainly for user-friendly applications, it was decided to scan another type of applications: legitimate application installers.
The goal of this test was to nd other patterns for the optimization and to tell whether the installers also often contain PE headers.
In the test of the installers, just "exe" les • RIPPER algorithm: from 5.34 % to 9.22 %.
• Naive Bayes algorithm: 3.80 %.
• Multi-Naive Bayes algorithm: 6.01 %.
Ronny Merkel et al. [4] made identication and evaluation of signicant features within PE les with FPR values from: 0.9 % to 52.4 %.
M. Belaoued and S. Mazouzi [7] use "False Alarm rate" (FA) value to express false hits.
With Chi-Square-Based Decision methods they received following results:
• TPFs subsets: from 4.76 % to 9.52 %
• APIs subsets: from 7.14 % to 28.57 %
• Combinations of API-TPF subsets: from 4.76 % to 9.52 % VOLUME: 1 | ISSUE: 2 | 2017 | November It is obvious, that the method introduced in this paper gives satisfying results in false positive rate unlike some other methods. However, this is mainly because our method is designed for parasitic viruses only and some types of les must be excluded to get more FPR accuracy.
Other described methods are used for wide range of malware.
Conclusion and Future
Work
The experiments show that examined method can detect specic malware types that are called parasitic viruses. The problem seems to be the installers and uninstallers these types of les are widely used by both user-friendly applications and malware. It is better to exclude these le types for the described detection method.
Multiple PE detection method can be used as a base for nding malware that is in some way connected to a host le, but due to the fact that there is a small amount of legitimate applications also containing multiple headers, we cannot recommend using this method as a standalone method or as a main detection method.
But we can recommend it as a fast method to label suspicious les for deeper analyzing.
There is space for improving our detecting method. We will use introduced method together with multiple other methods that would not have negative time impact. In our following research, we will try to nd out, if there exist Windows API functions that are often used by malware. Scanning these functions in samples with multiple PE headers will improve results of our method. In future, malware detection will be improved by adding AI as well.
Malware writers implement mechanisms to avoid multiple infections of the same le by parasitic viruses. Following research will include a deeper look at these mechanisms to use them for malware detection together with our hereby presented method.
